Berkeley is a philosopher more prone to being misunderstood by others; either by not admitting the conceivability of immaterialism, which shows a lack of philosophical enrichment, or by failing to understand the reasons behind it. Johnson's thus-refutation is the first kind. It's hard to tell whether those remarks are quips as quips, or quips as refutations. The philosophical quip is an abused art, now. It be done either in jest, or in earnest with a system to back it up. After militant secret societies of students at the University of Jena threw paving stones through Fichte's window, Goethe remarked it was "the most unpleasant way possible to be convinced of the existence of the Not-I." This one sticks in my head, though it's not even in jest a criticism of Fichte's idealism. Berkeley gets his fair share of jests. His doctor writes in a letter: "Poor philosopher Berkeley has now the idea of health, which was very hard to produce in him; for he had an idea of a strange fever on him so strong, that it was very hard to destroy it by introducing a contrary one." These are lighter criticisms; but on the other side, Hegel was a masterful quipper in the refutation sense, as he does in the Difference-essay about Bardili's "bipartite character of the object:"
On the one hand, an absolute materiality. Thinking cannot fit itself into it; indeed, it does not know what to do with it except to annul it, that is, to abstract from it. On the other hand, a property that again pertains to the object independent of all thinking, and yet a form that makes it suitable to be thought and which thinking must fit into as well as it can. And across this bipartite character of the object, thinking must "plunge headlong" into life. Thinking comes to philosophy with a broken neck from the tumble into such absolute duality.
